tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post6978601549702114309..comments2023-12-08T04:43:40.135-06:00Comments on The Fire and the Rose: Two apocalyptic families: a modest proposalUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger30125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-21529727217729912732013-02-07T10:42:43.738-06:002013-02-07T10:42:43.738-06:00Thank you, Fleming, for gracing this blog with you...Thank you, Fleming, for gracing this blog with your comment. I appreciate the interaction. Let me point out my comment in response to Shannon above where I acknowledge that, as a theologian, Käsemann certainly does belong with the "B" family. But I also want to point out that your three criteria for what counts as apocalyptic only underscores why I placed Käsemann in family "A." None of those three criteria is part of Käsemann's own stated definition for what counts as apocalyptic, namely, the literal, historical, future parousia of Christ. Your definition, shaped as it is by Martyn, is entirely compatible with someone like Karl Barth. But Käsemann's definition is not, which is why Barth rejected it and why Beker later pitted Barth against apocalyptic theology. These details are the reason why I think we must distinguish between the two families. We need to acknowledge that there are real differences that are internal to a larger apocalyptic "family resemblance."<br /><br />Having said all that, I don't think my dual family tree is really divided up in a "finely tuned way." Hence all the changes and corrections I've had to make already. I don't see these as hard and fast categories or types, despite how it may appear. These are flexible and malleable categories for the sole purpose of bringing clarity to the conversation. If it fails to achieve that, then I'm happy to dispense with it altogether.<br /><br />Again, thanks for the comment, and for the original blog post that got this all started. I'm a great admirer of your work.David W. Congdonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03009330707703611224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-85796039484898601712013-02-07T10:31:01.337-06:002013-02-07T10:31:01.337-06:00David, thank you for making use of my "family...David, thank you for making use of my "family tree." I am glad it is provoking discussion. I have posted something on my own blog regarding it: www.generousorthodoxy.org<br />I am grateful for the commonalities that you and I obviously share. However, I think it is a mistake to divide up the list in such a finely tuned way. From my perspective, people are falling into the wrong categories. For instance, Kasemann certainly belongs at the head of the list of the group that I identify. Surveying the landscape today, I think that these three criteria will serve to denote apocalyptic theologians:<br />1) The divine agency is the central emphasis and sine qua non. 2) The presence of an occupying Power must be insisted upon.<br />3) The cross-resurrection is a novum not to be located on a continuum. <br /> <br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Fleming Rutledgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17244388594893896996noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-11532445375166942102013-01-23T16:46:43.939-06:002013-01-23T16:46:43.939-06:00Though this thread has gone cold, I'd like to ...Though this thread has gone cold, I'd like to retract my earlier comment. I'd like to do so b/c (a) I didn't specify the sources I was drawing on in my response well enough & (b) after further consideration, I'm no longer as confident that Pannenberg does in fact belong in this family tree. While I may return to my original position later, I need to give this more thought b/c at this point I'm unsure.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-49345698841133310262013-01-18T07:30:26.081-06:002013-01-18T07:30:26.081-06:00Shannon,
I entirely agree with you about Käsemann...Shannon,<br /><br />I entirely agree with you about Käsemann. He's in A because of his historical definition of apocalyptic in the early 1960s and because I don't know of a place in his later writings where he offers a different definition. But in terms of his own theology, he's almost certainly in B. That much is quite true.<br /><br />I'll also confess that A is confusing because it is a mixture of historical and theological criteria. Since it's probably tripping up a lot of people, let me just put it this way:<br /><br /><i>I place a person in A if (a) they have a historical definition of apocalyptic as based in the views of Second Temple Judaism and/or the early Christian community, or (b) they have an apocalyptic theology that is compatible with or explicitly affirming of natural theology.</i>David W. Congdonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03009330707703611224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-79996853658552141712013-01-17T16:18:25.229-06:002013-01-17T16:18:25.229-06:00David, I appreciate your important qualifications ...David, I appreciate your important qualifications re: Käsemann's placement in Apocalyptic A, but I still wonder whether he is getting unfair treatment (as Bultmann has) and getting pidgeon-holed into a corner by subsequent classifications and misclassifications in the scholarly discussions that followed. I grant the main reason for why you put him where you do but I wonder if the "real" Käsemann really belongs there. It may be that my problem stems from finding his later essays to be enormously helpful in tying apocalyptic rightly to Paul and the Reformation. I think he is a valuable help in NT studies in that regard.Shannonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11263004194470810110noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-8583142591878000272013-01-17T15:32:48.459-06:002013-01-17T15:32:48.459-06:00Might the difference be that Pannenberg is post-ap...Might the difference be that Pannenberg is post-apocalyptic? That the conformity is a result of the always-already of God's redemptive (a Calvinist would say reconciling) work?Matthew Frosthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10232613079168523464noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-55705005523356945112013-01-17T12:17:47.008-06:002013-01-17T12:17:47.008-06:00Good updates, David. I actually proposed a paper ...Good updates, David. I actually proposed a paper for 2012 on Braaten's apocalyptic. As far as he's walked away from Barth and Moltmann, the apocalyptic is still there to be seen if you look for it.<br /><br />I definitely fall into the trap of arguing B against certain versions of A, but I will also acknowledge the rightness of other versions of A. I think there's a basic difference between, for example, Gutierrez and Milbank, and that it comes down to what I will call a humility of self-conception. This is certainly not true of all liberation forms, but I think all good apocalyptic of either family recognizes the self as under critique from outside, whether God upholds one side or none/all.<br /><br />And I'll moderate my earlier comments on Pannenberg in line with what's already been suggested since: he's an odd duck. He is certainly not family B, for multiple reasons. I guess for me the point that has to be made is what distinguishes Pannenberg from, say, Aquinas. Thomas leaves no possibility for disjunction between creature and Creator, only a continuous privative gradient that can produce resistance to, but not ultimately arrest or reverse, the divine formal determination of all things. Creation illustrates the teleological order, which is never truly violated. And yet there is still judgment based upon sin, and his eschatology reflects this, because Thomas is not a determinist. <br /><br />Pannenberg instead posits the eschatological prolapse of Christ into the world, which illustrates the teleological order as that which is truly violated by sin. And yet there is in Pannenberg an epistemological continuity by which naturalism still works. It is as though the revelation is continuous with the order of the world, just not with the order of our lives. So if the dissonance is only that between midpoint and endpoint, present state and future state, then how much distance is there between belonging to apocalyptic A, and just having a Reformation doctrine of human sin? If Christ is the revelation of the end of all things, and is disjunctive with our sinful existence and its effects, <i>but not with the order of the world and of history</i>, and we may still use the world and history to understand God, is this apocalyptic?Matthew Frosthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10232613079168523464noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-1654121349795000602013-01-16T21:07:43.962-06:002013-01-16T21:07:43.962-06:00Kyle,
It's a fair question, so let me address...Kyle,<br /><br />It's a fair question, so let me address it. I will admit that, on the whole, I personally self-identify more with the B family. That much is true. But that was never the basis for making this family tree. Rather than state why here, I'm going to post it as an additional update in the blog post itself, since I think it will be relevant to many more people.<br /><br />But let me just say this: I am not trying to draw a wedge between anybody. I'm not trying to pit elder and younger Blumhardt against each other, nor pit Martyn against Käsemann. The aim here is twofold: (a) to identify two distinct ways of understanding the apocalypse and (b) to indicate a family resemblance among theologians who are otherwise not often brought into connection with each other.David W. Congdonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03009330707703611224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-7598814198513541292013-01-16T20:01:26.794-06:002013-01-16T20:01:26.794-06:00Andrew,
It is just a question. I think it would be...Andrew,<br />It is just a question. I think it would be worth knowing if this symbolizes what David consider "good" and "bad" apocalyptic. I don't think several of the people would recognize other people on the list as being from a different tree. <br />It would be interested to see these developments laid as one tree with different branches and overlaps and more families but that's a different project for a different day. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15393045921654670778noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-59793902096468683252013-01-16T19:49:34.415-06:002013-01-16T19:49:34.415-06:00Kyle, I think it would be entirely unfair. There a...Kyle, I think it would be entirely unfair. There are significant distinctions that David is laying out, and they are distinctions worth noting.Andrew Esquedahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09081654399429199682noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-30671124941267638752013-01-16T19:05:42.381-06:002013-01-16T19:05:42.381-06:00Honest question from an innocent bystander:
Would...Honest question from an innocent bystander: <br />Would it be fair to say one list is people you agree with and the other list is people you don't agree with?<br />For which people is this not true? Because it seems for several you drawing a wedge where there is none. Particular the biblical scholars who should maybe have their own list. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15393045921654670778noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-80477041225314159442013-01-16T15:23:44.700-06:002013-01-16T15:23:44.700-06:00Pannenberg would, I think, would be precluded from...Pannenberg would, I think, would be precluded from being in category B for the mere reason that Pannenberg wouldn't agree with the idea that the new age exists paradoxically and noncompetitively with the old. The events in history have meaning in and of themselves. This, however, does not mean that they cannot also have an apocalyptically anticipatory orientation. At the same time, I don't think Pannenberg fits very nicely into Category AAndrew Esquedahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09081654399429199682noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-49779384759017684912013-01-16T14:44:26.563-06:002013-01-16T14:44:26.563-06:00I'm at work, so I have to be brief for now, bu...I'm at work, so I have to be brief for now, but I want to quickly disagree with Matthew's assessment of Pannenberg. The proleptic revelation in Christ is fundamentally anticipatory in nature and thus assumes a greater or more complete "horizon," and Pannenberg draws on strains of apocalyptic thinking in understanding the nature of that final horizon. Thus, there is "room" for or an assumption of "dissonance." Admittedly, perhaps due to the influence of Hegel on him, such dissonance may be weaker or less "shocking," as Bradshaw would put it, but nonetheless it is there. FWIW, I would humbly suggest that Pannenberg does belong somewhere w/in the family tree, though I'm not 100% sure where he should be placed (probably A), given that he is a bit of an odd-ball in this family.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-13561946819948628642013-01-16T13:24:25.144-06:002013-01-16T13:24:25.144-06:00I certainly see your hesitation with Jenson. I mig...I certainly see your hesitation with Jenson. I might tend to think that his earlier works would fit nicely within apocalyptic A, but that his later, and more ecclesiologically oriented works would not. In regards to Pannenberg, I think he deserves a spot on the list. His entire theological project is predicated upon the idea that the biblical message is eschatological in character. I can see how one could argue that his understanding of history as revelation might take away from the significance of God's apocalyptic invasion, but at the same time, for Pannenberg, history is always in route to the apocalyptic establishment of God's kingdom whereby God's glory will be demonstrated en toto. Just some thoughts.Andrew Esquedahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09081654399429199682noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-66178345441123738212013-01-16T10:44:28.900-06:002013-01-16T10:44:28.900-06:00Thanks, Scott. Done.Thanks, Scott. Done.David W. Congdonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03009330707703611224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-13628364038499161802013-01-16T10:31:31.574-06:002013-01-16T10:31:31.574-06:00Interesting. I think your instinct on Stringfellow...Interesting. I think your instinct on Stringfellow is correct, and you can remove the question mark after his name.J. Scott Jacksonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17689056473295120103noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-43219489584687110412013-01-15T07:36:54.774-06:002013-01-15T07:36:54.774-06:00The Pannenberg question is interesting. The man c...The Pannenberg question is interesting. The man certainly considers the eschaton, but having an eschatology doesn't make you apocalyptic. He even has the idea that the eschaton is already proleptically revealed in Christ—but the result is not an apocalyptic dissonance. Prolepsis lets Pannenberg engage in a teleology that <i>resolves</i> existential dissonance!Matthew Frosthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10232613079168523464noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-61842266822359366232013-01-15T07:31:48.042-06:002013-01-15T07:31:48.042-06:00With respect to this little discussion of "de...With respect to this little discussion of "determinacy," perhaps it would be better to speak of what, exactly, each kind of apocalypse validates. It must be said, I think, that all apocalyptic "really has content for us here and now."<br /><br />Family B reveals the absolute invalidity, and so the merely-relative validity, of all things. "Religion without religion" makes a nice catch phrase for such an idea, but don't take it literally! Paul would rip into both sides of Matthew's dialectic <i>and still point them both towards something positive</i>. Family B inevitably identifies the determinate content of revelation as outside, enabling absolute criticism of all positions.<br /><br />Family A, on the other hand, takes a side, and perceives that revelation also takes a side. The determinate content of revelation affirms something that exists as right, enabling relative criticism of all other positions. Self-criticism only happens relative to an ideal of the self as revealed.Matthew Frosthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10232613079168523464noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-14214446143304936012013-01-14T23:28:44.561-06:002013-01-14T23:28:44.561-06:00I can see where you would get that idea, Geoff, bu...I can see where you would get that idea, Geoff, but that's not what I have in mind re: apocalyptic A. Let me state it clearly: it is *not* determinacy that differentiates A and B. I said that was only a loose analogy, and perhaps I should have denied its validity altogether.<br /><br />What differentiates A and B are two *kinds* of determinacy: competitive and noncompetitive, visible and invisible. For A, the apocalyptic event is properly something that occurs on the surface of history as we experience and encounter it; for B, the event does not belong on the surface of history and can only be seen by those who have what Martyn calls the "bifocal vision" of faith. To be sure, many of the theologians listed in A would want to emphasize the role of faith. I'll certainly grant as much. But I discern a common emphasis on the apocalyptic event being measurable and observable within the world, whether in the form of a particular community of virtue (Hauerwas) or a particular political mobilization (most of them) or a particular supernatural occurrence (J.C. Blumhardt). <br /><br />To be sure, I recognize that many, perhaps you are among them, will say that only A has determinacy. But I presuppose that the apocalyptic event can be determinate without being available for general observation or investigation. In fact, that is precisely what makes B distinct; to give up that claim is to give up its fidelity to the apocalyptic event itself.David W. Congdonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03009330707703611224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-9019568988652865642013-01-14T17:04:49.395-06:002013-01-14T17:04:49.395-06:00LofW supersedes B&E in the sense of moving fro...LofW supersedes B&E in the sense of moving from the ontologoy of being to a phenomenology of appearing, but in no way replaces the general framework of the event, only completes it with a subjectivated body.<br /><br />But putting Badiou aside, I'm still wondering about your distinctions (why discuss how Badiou fits in with your typology when I'm not clear on the typology). Perhaps I'm reading too much into this statement, but you say that Apocalyptic A is either "historico-metaphysical (i.e., kingdom of God as the supernatural, millennial reign of Christ) and historico-political (i.e., kingdom of God as revolutionary order or alternative polis)." I read this in the sense that these types give the apocalypse some sort of determinacy (i.e. it really has content for us here and now), thereby making it less apocalyptic (Please correct me if I'm wrong here). I don't remember you giving an alternative counter-example of these position so I supplied the non-determinate "religion w/o religion" for the B category (and again, perhaps that is where I'm off). But if this is where I've gone ascue then please clarify so as not to inadvertently placing you into that category.<br /><br />Also, I'm not sure the A category theologians would find themselves in your definition that they attempt to see without the vision of faith and only the B category live by the "parabolic vision of faith" (which I gather also stands in for dialectical theology, but I could be wrong on that). <br /><br />Anyway, I've been scurrying around in other corners of theology lately (Hegel and Augustine) so I'm still trying to get a handle on your angle on apocalyptic. But I am interested, so thanks for the conversation. geoffrey holsclawhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00315656374467205541noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-46046957465827338802013-01-14T16:30:37.265-06:002013-01-14T16:30:37.265-06:00Nowhere have I denied that apocalyptic B is concer...Nowhere have I denied that apocalyptic B is concerned with bodies and languages faithful to the event. That was the whole point of my clarifying the issue of politics in the post itself, as well as my clarification to you about the issue of determinateness. Again, I think you are using your "religion without religion" analogy to misread me, and that's resulting in a lack of understanding.<br /><br />To the issue of Badiou, it remains the case -- does it not? -- that the event cannot be circumscribed within any formation of bodies and languages; it remains an exception to every constellation of human subjects. It is, as he says, "transpositional"; it is a migratory truth that always moves ahead of us and resists all ossification in the form of a "party."<br /><br />And, contrary to your reading, I *do* believe that LofW supercedes B&E, **precisely because Badiou himself says so in his Second Manifesto!**David W. Congdonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03009330707703611224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-63781842025553878632013-01-14T16:23:55.794-06:002013-01-14T16:23:55.794-06:00Well, I guess on a strict accounting of how Zizek ...Well, I guess on a strict accounting of how Zizek speaks of apocalyptic then he may belong in A, but I think the clear driff of this philosophy is B (at least as I'm understand how you are using the terms). Certainly Zizek and Badiou are very far apart on other issues. <br /><br />But back to Badiou. I'm not sure I agree with your characterization. There is too much antagonism between the old and new. I agree with Bosteels that there is much more dialectic in Badiou that strict opposition (but not dialectic as you are using it, I think). The difference between democratic materialsim and a materialistic dialectic is not "bodies and language" vs "truth as exception" but that either their are only "bodies and language" or "there are only bodies and language, except for truth." I think this is where you misread "politics without parties" to mean something like "religion without religion," but that is not close to Badiou's intention. Rather he still seeing the need for a concrete militant collective (i.e. a determinate church), but realizes that the party form has been thoroughly co-opted by state management of bodies and languages. But he is is not way against the formation of bodies and language as long as they are faithful to the event (which always retroactively re-organizes the situation). <br /><br />Certainly LofW expands on the figures of subjectivity, but I don't think it supersedes the contours of the event from B&E (declaring the event and discerning its consequences are still essential for Badiou militant subjectivity).<br /><br />I realize I'm pressing into the "estranged third cousins of your family trees, but perhaps these are the ones that will make most clear what the difference is between them.<br /><br />Thanks again for responding and clarifying. geoffrey holsclawhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00315656374467205541noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-33129056581162989642013-01-14T16:00:00.325-06:002013-01-14T16:00:00.325-06:00Yes, I was anticipating that objection. I also thi...Yes, I was anticipating that objection. I also think this is where your analogy is leading you astray. Remember, the distinction has nothing to do with determinateness as such; it has to do with a certain way of understanding how the event relates to a world. <br /><br />Let me say up front that I wavered about Zizek, almost placing him with Badiou for the obvious reasons. But he has writtenn enough on the topic of the apocalyptic that indicates, at least rhetorically, that he belongs with A. For instance, his claim that, even though the Christian fundamentalist understanding of apocalypse "is considered the most ridiculous but dangerous as to its content, it is the one closest to the 'millenarist' radical emancipatory logic" (Paul's New Moment, 186). However, I'll grant that this logic is in many respects closer to B. So I'm willing to move him around if need be. Badiou, however, is another story.<br /><br />I am presupposing that the Badiou of "Logics of Worlds," in contrast to his earlier work, is the normative Badiou here. That being said, I think you can map A and B on to Badiou's distinction between democratic materialism and materialist dialectics. Apocalyptic A locates the event at the level of bodies and languages; apocalyptic B locates it on the level of "truth as exception." The apocalypse cannot be objectified; it only leaves behind a "trace" or "primordial statement" (what we might call parables or witnesses) that mobilizes faithful responses, but these responses are not themselves the truth-event. It's crucial here to take into account the entire phenomenology that Badiou provides in LofW, but I can't go into everything here. I'll just say that it is no accident that Badiou draws upon Kierkegaard. His position here is highly existential and dialectical. Granted, he is a materialist and does indeed think that the new occurs in history as a new political order. But there is also a surprising convergence between Badiou and Agamben in that this political order cannot be ranged alongside or identified with any order already in existence. As Badiou puts it, he is after a "politics without parties." As I understand it, this places him squarely in the B camp.David W. Congdonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03009330707703611224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-55647825555307138162013-01-14T15:30:17.606-06:002013-01-14T15:30:17.606-06:00Thanks for the clarification.
Also, while I'm...Thanks for the clarification.<br /><br />Also, while I'm not qualified to speak about many of the names here, it seems that you have exactly reversed the positions of Žižek and Badiou. Badiou, via the event, is given over to a pretty determinate practices directed by the fidelity to the event while it is Žižek who remain between and beyond all social configurations. <br /><br />Or did you have something else in mind as an organizing principle? <br /><br />Thanks.geoffrey holsclawhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00315656374467205541noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11393723.post-421373231199984152013-01-14T14:46:44.723-06:002013-01-14T14:46:44.723-06:00It would be a fairly loose analogy, but that's...It would be a fairly loose analogy, but that's on the right track, I would say.David W. Congdonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03009330707703611224noreply@blogger.com